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Thomson Reuters Westlaw Journal Intellectual Property

Q&A: Scott Karren, Nathan Mutter on the Supreme Court and Patent-Eligibility Standards

Republished with permission, originally appeared in Thomson Reuters Westlaw Journal Intellectual Property on March 11, 2020

In 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court released Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014), which addressed the standard for applying Section 101 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. §101. Since that time, an avalanche of cases surrounding patent eligibility have bombarded the courts. In recent months, the Supreme Court has been asked by parties in numerous cases to clarify the bounds of Section 101.

Scott Karren is a patent partner at the firm’s Salt Lake City office. He provides intellectual property counsel to large technology companies, with a focus on developing and managing strategic patent portfolios, and preparing and prosecuting applications. He manages a number of international patent portfolios in the electrical- and computer-related arts; prepares opinions; counsels clients on issues of patent infringement, validity and product design; and advises on strategic patent acquisitions and prelitigation strategies.

Nathan Mutter is a patent attorney at the firm’s Boulder, Colorado office. He has experience prosecuting patent applications for companies developing sophisticated technologies across the medical device and wireless communications industries. He uses his engineering background to understand his client’s products, business goals, industry and competitive landscape.

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